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Note
Superfund and Tort Common Law: Why Courts
Should Adopt a Contemporary Analytical
Framework for Divisibility of Harm
Joshua M. Greenberg
The year is 1980.1 The Gordon family had owned their farm
in Arvin, California for fifty years and never had any concerns
about drinking water quality. Indeed, the Gordons had been
pumping water from their private well without any issue for as
long as Michael, father of four and husband to Susan, could remember since taking over the farm from his father some thirty
years earlier. However, on the morning of November 17, Michael
noticed that the water from the well had a peculiar scent to it,
and tasted bitter and slightly metallic. Susan confirmed that the
water tasted “funny,” and urged her husband to report the incident to the proper authorities. Concerned for the health of his
family and thinking someone had tampered with the farm’s only
source of drinking water, Michael called the local police department and reported his concerns. After finding no evidence of
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to everyone who provided ideas and feedback throughout the writing process,
especially Professor Alexandra Klass, Professor Brad Clary, and Minnesota Law
Review editors and staff. A special thank you to my family, especially my parents, and to Taylor Mayhall for their love and support throughout law school
and the writing process. Copyright © 2018 by Joshua M. Greenberg.
1. This fictionalized introductory narrative is based on the history of the
Arvin Superfund Site, the place at issue in the seminal CERCLA divisibility
case—Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S.
599 (2009). For a summary of the historical background of the Arvin Superfund
Site, see id. at 602–05 (discussing Brown and Bryant’s twenty-eight-year agricultural chemical distribution operation at the Arvin Superfund Site and the
toxic havoc that resulted thereafter); John C. Cruden, Acting Assistant Attorney
Gen., Env’t & Nat. Res. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech Before the Environmental Law Institute: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway Company v. United States (May 29, 2009) [hereinafter Cruden ELI Speech], https://www.justice.gov/enrd/acting-aag-john-cruden-s
-remarks-burlington-northern-santa-fe-railway-co. See infra Part I.C for a more
detailed discussion of the Burlington Northern saga.
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trespass or wrongdoing, the police referred the matter to the California Department of Toxic Substances Control (CDTSC) to determine the extent of the contamination.
The Gordon family was not the first landowner in the area
to report potentially contaminated drinking water, and they
would not be the last. As other landowners with private wells
continued to intermittently complain about bitter-tasting water
for the next three years, CDTSC began to connect the dots. During their investigation of numerous private wells, CDTSC determined that there was toxic pesticide contamination in the
groundwater and contacted the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) for assistance in finding the source of the contamination. In 1983, CDTSC and EPA began investigating the Arvin
Plant in Arvin, CA—home to Brown & Bryant, Inc. (B & B), an
agricultural chemical distribution company.2 The most noticeable thing about the Arvin Plant was the odor. The acrid stench
of chemicals permeated the entire grounds of the nearly thirteen-acre facility.3 Along the walls of the main warehouse were
massive bulk storage tanks each the size of a standard sedan;
countless barrels housing a multitude of different pesticides
were precariously stacked one on top of the other.
A brownish-red chemical, the source of the odor, leaked from
many of the barrels and bulk storage tanks onto the concrete
floor, as haphazardly placed buckets overflowed and failed to
contain the errant liquid. B & B employees periodically sprayed
down the warehouse floor and other equipment, washing away
the toxic pesticides into the surrounding soil and nearby unlined
drainage pond, eventually contaminating the groundwater beneath the Arvin Plant.4 EPA and CDTSC were particularly concerned about toxic threats to neighboring drinking water supplies, as the “plume of contaminated ground water located under
the facility . . . threatened to leach into an adjacent supply of potential drinking water.”5
In cooperation with EPA and CDTSC, B & B “undertook
some efforts at remediation,”6 but discontinued all operations in
2. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 604.
3. “B & B opened its business on a 3.8-acre parcel of former farmland in
Arvin, California, and in 1975, expanded operations onto an adjacent 0.9-acre
parcel of land . . . .” Id. at 602–03. The Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
Company and the Union Pacific Railroad Company (the Railroads) jointly
owned the 0.9-acre parcel and leased it to B & B. See id. at 603, 606.
4. Id. at 603.
5. Id. at 604; see also Cruden ELI Speech, supra note 1.
6. Remedial actions address the release of hazardous substances through

2018]

SUPERFUND & TORT COMMON LAW

1001

1989 due to insolvency.7 EPA, pursuant to its authority under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA)8 and in cooperation with CDTSC,
began cleanup activities at the Arvin facility that same year.9
B & B would normally be responsible for funding federal cleanup
activities as owner of the facility.10 However, nearly ten years
after B & B declared bankruptcy, EPA sued the Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company and the Union Pacific
Railway Company (the Railroads), joint owners of part of the
property, to recover the government’s expended cleanup costs.11
Under CERCLA case law that existed at that time and absent a
showing of divisibility,12 the Railroads most likely would have
been held jointly and severally liable for all of the governmental
response costs towards remediating the soil and groundwater
contamination at the Arvin facility, despite the fact that B & B
was directly responsible for the contamination.

emphasizing permanent cleanup solutions. Remedial actions are often contrasted with removal actions, which are short-term solutions that address the
release of hazardous substances requiring a prompt response. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 9601(23)–(24) (2012); Superfund: CERCLA Overview, EPA, https://
www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-cercla-overview (last visited Oct. 31, 2018).
7. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 605.
8. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75, more commonly called Superfund, establishes the framework for how the government addresses threats to “human
health or the environment resulting from releases or potential releases of hazardous substances from abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous waste sites.” See
TECH. INNOVATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE,
EPA, CERCLA/SUPERFUND ORIENTATION MANUAL, at I-1 (1992) [hereinafter
SUPERFUND ORIENTATION MANUAL], https://semspub.epa.gov/work/11/174484
.pdf. This Note uses the terms CERCLA and Superfund interchangeably.
9. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 605.
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
11. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 605.
12. The legislative history of CERCLA indicates, and subsequent litigation
confirms, that Congress intended CERCLA liability to be governed by evolving
principles of federal common law. See infra Part I.A. Under the common law of
torts, a party otherwise jointly and severally liable may limit their liability by
showing that the harm in question is divisible, or capable of being apportioned
to multiple causes. In the CERCLA arena, courts apply the Restatement (Second) of Torts and ask whether “there is a reasonable basis for determining the
contribution of each cause to a single harm.” Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 614
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1965)).
See also infra Part II.A for a more detailed discussion on how courts have applied divisibility post-Burlington Northern.
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However, in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.
v. United States,13 the Supreme Court held that the harm14 at
the Arvin facility was divisible, and apportioned the Railroads’
share to nine percent, leaving the remaining financial burden on
the federal government and other parties that undertook
cleanup efforts voluntarily.15 Remediation efforts at the Arvin
Superfund16 Site to date, including groundwater treatment and
soil capping,17 have been largely successful at reducing the risk
of potential exposure to contaminants18 and the Railroads, who
were not directly responsible for the contamination, were able to
avoid paying more than their fair share of the cleanup costs by
asserting a divisibility defense.
13. 556 U.S. at 600.
14. To further complicate an already complicated analysis, courts have
struggled to define “harm” in a CERCLA context. See, e.g., Steve C. Gold, DisJointed? Several Approaches to Divisibility After Burlington Northern, 11 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 307, 315 (2009) (citing O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 180 (1st Cir.
1989)). The court in O’Neil “express[ed] doubt as to whether ‘harm,’ for divisibility purposes, consists of response costs, of environmental contamination that
actually occurred, or of environmental contamination averted by response action.” Id. at 315 n.35; see also United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 520 F.3d 918, 938–39 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 556 U.S. 599 (2009) (outlining
different approaches for interpreting “harm” within the CERCLA context).
15. The district court held that the Railroads’ liability was limited to “9%
of the total Site CERCLA response costs including interest and attorneys’ fees”
based on geographic, temporal, and volumetric/toxicity factors. United States v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., No. CV-F-92-5068 OWW, No. CV-F-96-6226
OWW, No. CV-F-96-6228 OWW, 2003 WL 25518047, at *91 (E.D. Cal. July 15,
2003). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court’s finding that there was a reasonable basis for apportioning the Railroads’
liability, holding the Railroads jointly and severally liable. Burlington N., 520
F.3d at 946. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the district court’s original finding of divisibility for the Railroads. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 619.
16. “Superfund” is often informally used to refer to CERCLA. What Is Superfund?, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/superfund/what-superfund (last visited
Oct. 31, 2018). Superfund can also refer to the Superfund Trust Fund, a fund
used by the government to pay for cleanup activities. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507
(2012); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(11) (2012); SUPERFUND ORIENTATION MANUAL, supra
note 8, at II-1 to II-2.
17. Soil capping does not destroy or remove hazardous contaminants, but
rather, involves placing a protective cover over contaminated soil to isolate the
contamination at issue. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE,
EPA, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO CAPPING 1 (2012), https://semspub.epa.gov/work/
HQ/158704.pdf. Caps can range in complexity from a single layer of asphalt
aimed at isolating low-level contamination to multiple-layer caps of different
materials for more hazardous sites. See id.
18. See Superfund Site: Brown & Bryant, Inc. (Arvin Plant), Arvin, CA
Cleanup Activities, EPA, https://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/SiteProfiles/index
.cfm?fuseaction=second.Cleanup&id=0901425 (last visited Oct. 31, 2018).
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However, in contrast to the outcome in Burlington Northern,
the vast majority of parties found liable under CERCLA are not
successful in invoking a divisibility defense to limit their financial contributions towards reimbursement of cleanup costs.19 Defendants found liable to the government or another private party
for cost recovery can bring a claim for contribution under CERCLA Section 113, which allows the court to consider equitable
factors in allocating liability.20 However, where a Section 113
suit is not available to a defendant because other potentially liable parties are not financially viable, unable to be located, or
have resolved their liability with the government through a settlement,21 that defendant’s only option for limiting its liability is
to prove that the harm in question is divisible using causation
principles.22 Whereas holding a defendant liable for the cost of
an entire cleanup is fair and reasonable when that party was a
direct cause of a substantial portion of the contamination, parties that are less culpable (such as the Railroads in Burlington
Northern) are often left paying more than their fair share of
cleanup costs.23
This Note surveys the landscape of CERCLA cases dealing
with apportionment of harm and argues that divisibility defenses have been largely unsuccessful because of the courts’ reliance on the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the high evidentiary bar to prove a “reasonable basis for apportionment.” It
further argues that because Congress intended CERCLA’s liability scheme to be governed by the evolving principles of common law, and because states have been moving away from joint
and several liability, courts should adopt the Restatement
(Third) of Torts in analyzing whether harm can be apportioned.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts differs from the Restatement
(Second) in that the former reflects the states’ general shift away
from joint and several liability schemes by being more receptive
to divisibility arguments, allowing for apportionment where a
19. See infra notes 131–34 and accompanying text.
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f ) (1); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543
U.S. 157, 160–61 (2004) (holding that Section 113 contribution claims are only
available to parties that have been found liable under Section 107); infra notes
83, 146 and accompanying text for more discussion on the differences between
apportionment under Section 107 and allocation under Section 113.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f ) (2) (“A person who has resolved its liability to
the . . . [government] in an administrative or judicially approved settlement
shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in
the settlement.”).
22. See infra Part I.B.
23. See, e.g., infra Part II.A.2; see also infra Appendix.
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party can prove that it is liable for “less than the entire amount
of damages.”24 Further, the Restatement (Third) uses a two-step
process for apportionment of liability in an effort to effectuate
the policy that defendants should not be responsible for damages
that they did not cause—a rule that better reflects the current
state of common law and statutory tort law in the states.25
Part I contextualizes CERCLA, describes how liability under the statute works in practice, and discusses Burlington
Northern in detail. Part II discusses how courts before and after
Burlington Northern have been relatively consistent in analyzing divisibility defenses under the Restatement (Second), how
those approaches lag behind the rest of tort law doctrine in the
states, and how the current state of affairs is best reflected in
the Restatement (Third). Part III argues that to better align
CERCLA divisibility practice with the development of state tort
law, courts should adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts in analyzing divisibility of harm in Superfund cases. This Note concludes that the current practice of presumptive joint and several
liability under the Restatement (Second) in CERCLA actions is
outdated and that it should be updated to better reflect the more
prevalent rule of comparative responsibility.
I. CERCLA LIABILITY IN CONTEXT
To better understand why the analytical framework for divisibility analyses should be updated, it is important to establish
how and why the CERCLA liability scheme came about in the
first place. Section A discusses Congress’s motivations in creating CERCLA and how inopportune timing forced the House and
Senate to compromise on the final law. Section B discusses how
CERCLA works in practice, with a specific focus on its liability
provisions and divisibility of harm, using the first seminal CERCLA case as an example. Section C discusses the Burlington
Northern saga in detail, focusing on the factual determinations
made by the district court, eventually resulting in the U.S. Supreme Court upholding the Railroads’ divisibility defense.

24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 26 cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 2000); Michael Foy, Apportioning Cleanup Costs in the New Era
of Joint and Several CERCLA Liability, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 625, 648 n.172
(2011).
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 26 cmt. d.
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A.

CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING CERCLA’S ENACTMENT
AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The primary motivation behind enacting CERCLA was the
“highly publicized Love Canal tragedy,” which cost the American
public $27 million in cleanup costs by 1980.26 At the time, “Love
Canal [was] one of the most appalling environmental tragedies
in American history.”27 From the early 1920s until 1953, the
Love Canal site in Niagara Falls, New York was used as a chemical dumpsite for municipal and industrial waste by the Hooker
Chemical Company.28 In the late 1950s, after the dumpsite was
filled in and sold to the City of Niagara Falls, NY, a public school
and approximately 100 family homes were built over the site.29
As the years passed, “82 different compounds, 11 of them suspected carcinogens,” percolated through the soil as drum containers rotted and leached their contents into the areas surrounding the homes and public school.30 By the late 1970s, the
environmental havoc was evident—“trees and gardens were
turning black and dying[,] . . . [p]uddles of noxious substances
were in [residents’] yards . . . [and] basements . . . . Everywhere
the air had a faint, choking smell.”31 In the immediate aftermath
of the Love Canal tragedy, the State of New York bought out all
of the homes affected by the contamination.32 President Jimmy
Carter “approved emergency financial aid for the Love Canal
area.”33 Although EPA had begun to address toxic pollution
through a variety of other legal frameworks,34 the question of
who should be held liable for previously disposed-of hazardous
26. J.P. Sean Maloney, A Legislative History of Liability Under CERCLA,
16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 517, 517 (1992) (citing Frank P. Grad, A Legislative
History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability (“Superfund”) Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982)).
27. Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, EPA J., Jan. 1979, at 17.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The chemical leaching resulted from the landfill site exploding, as
record amounts of rainfall triggered the explosion. Id.
31. Id. Other consequences of the toxic contamination at Love Canal included a “disturbingly high rate of miscarriages” and birth defects. Id.
32. Id. at 18.
33. Id. The appropriation of emergency federal funds for Love Canal was
the first in American history to be approved “for something other than a ‘natural’ disaster.” Id.
34. “The Clean Air and Water Acts, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Pesticide Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, [and] the Toxic Substances Control Act” are all “essential links” in addressing the problem of hazardous waste. Id.
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substances remained unanswered until 1980 when CERCLA
was enacted.35
Congress’s ultimate comprehensive cleanup scheme, known
as CERCLA, or Superfund, resulted from many compromises in
the legislature, which are reflected in the somewhat vague liability provisions of CERCLA,36 as the law was “hastily passed in
the waning days of the lame duck session of the 96th Congress.”37 Three bills, H.R. 85,38 H.R. 7020,39 and S. 148040 eventually became part of the Superfund law.41
H.R. 85 was originally titled the “Oil Pollution Liability and
Compensation Act,” and “as amended, included provisions for a
comprehensive system of liability and compensation for oil spill
damage and removal costs.”42 This system of liability, while limited to damage from oil spills, provided that “with certain limits
and defenses, operators or owners of vessels or facilities were to
be ‘jointly, severally and strictly liable for all damages.’”43 There
was little debate on the House floor regarding H.R. 85 and on
September 19, 1980, the House passed it and sent the bill to the
Senate.44 Eventually, some provisions of H.R. 85 unrelated to liability “became incorporated into the final Senate Superfund
bill.”45
The next bill incorporated into CERCLA was H.R. 7020,46
which was originally introduced as an amendment to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).47 Because the
35. See id.
36. CERCLA’s main liability provision, Section 107, states that Potentially
Responsible Parties (PRPs) “‘shall be liable’ for cleanup costs, leaving unclear
the standard of liability it imposes.” Maloney, supra note 26, at 518; see also 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012). For a more detailed discussion of how CERCLA’s liability provisions work in practice, see infra Part I.B.
37. Maloney, supra note 26, at 519.
38. H.R. 85, 96th Cong. (1979).
39. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. (1980).
40. S. 1480, 96th Cong. (1979).
41. Maloney, supra note 26, at 518.
42. Id. at 519 (citing Grad, supra note 26, at 3).
43. Id. (quoting Grad, supra note 26, at 3); see also H.R. 85, 96th Cong.
§ 104, 126 CONG. REC. H9187 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980).
44. Maloney, supra note 26, at 520.
45. Id. Among the provisions of H.R. 85 that were incorporated were those
including the concept of government response authority for releases of hazardous substances that were not hazardous wastes (not including oil). See Grad,
supra note 26, at 31.
46. Maloney, supra note 26, at 521 (citing 126 CONG. REC. H26,336).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–92 (2012). RCRA “was passed by Congress in 1976 to
compel responsible parties, including the United States, to dispose of toxic
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scope of H.R. 7020 was initially rather limited,48 the House debate focused on making the liability provisions of the bill more
stringent.49
In particular, Congressman Al Gore proposed two amendments aimed at making the bill’s liability standard strict liability and requiring divisibility to be proven by a preponderance of
the evidence.50 Congressman Gore and others believed that H.R.
7020’s liability provisions were particularly deficient and the two
amendments were offered to “insure that those companies and
individuals who [were] responsible for . . . hazardous waste problems [would] bear their share of the cleanup cost burden.”51 The
first amendment removed the incentive and ability for parties to
contract away liability, and also insured that a negligent defendant could not escape liability, even if the harm resulted from unrelated third-party actions.52 This made H.R. 7020’s liability
standard strict liability.53 The second amendment focused on
joint and several liability and aimed to limit the apparent loopholes in the original liability scheme of H.R. 7020 by requiring
defendants to prove apportionability by a preponderance of the
evidence—a move that brought H.R. 7020 closer to the common
law principles of apportionment of harm.54 The House, viewing
the strict liability and apportionment provisions of the Gore
Amendments as consistent with CERCLA’s purpose, adopted the
amendments, passed H.R. 7020, and sent the bill to the Senate
on September 23, 1980.55

wastes in an environmentally sound manner.” Maloney, supra note 26, at 521
n.20 (citing Roger W. Andersen, The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976: Closing the Gap, 3 WIS. L. REV. 635, 636–37 (1978)).
48. The original bill did not apply to hazardous waste caused by oil or pollution in navigable waters and instead focused on inventory and cleanup of “inactive waste disposal sites.” Id.
49. Most supporters of H.R. 7020 were in favor of “stricter liability provisions” that allowed for EPA’s rapid recovery of expended cleanup costs. Maloney, supra note 26, at 522 (citing 126 CONG. REC. H26,339–40 (daily ed. Sept.
19, 1980) (memorandum of Rep. Staggers (D-W. Va.))).
50. See id. at 525–28.
51. See id. at 523 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. H26,781 (daily ed. Sept. 23,
1980) (statement of Rep. Gore (D-Tenn.))).
52. Id. at 525.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 526–28 (citing 126 CONG. REC. H26,784–85 (daily ed. Sept. 23,
1980) (statement of Rep. Gore (D-Tenn.))).
55. Id. at 529. (citing 126 CONG. REC. H26,788, H26,798 (daily ed. Sept. 23,
1980)).
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The final bill incorporated into CERCLA was S. 1480, originally titled the “Environmental Emergency Response Act.”56 The
1980 Presidential Election, however, significantly altered the final version of CERCLA that was eventually enacted because the
election resulted in a lame duck session of Congress.57 Given the
tight deadline and pressures created by an outgoing Congress,
only the compromise agreement proposed by Senators Robert
Stafford and Jennings Randolph had a chance of passing both
houses.58 The Stafford-Randolph compromise was introduced as
an amendment to the original S. 1480, which in effect, created
an entirely new bill drawing inspiration from its predecessors.59
According to the bill’s supporters, the amended S. 1480 incorporated the best provisions of the three other bills and eliminated the more controversial provisions.60 Specifically, the
amended S. 1480 retained a strict liability standard61 but eliminated any reference to joint and several liability—instead, the
bill relied on “common law principles” to determine when defendants should be held jointly and severally liable.62 Congress anticipated that relying on such principles for determining liability
would result in “extensive litigation.”63 While some viewed the

56. Id. at 530 (citing S. 1480, 96th Cong. (1980), 126 CONG. REC. S30,897
(daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 531.
60. Id. at 533 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. S30,935 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)
(statement of Sen. Stafford (R-Vt.))) (“Fundamentally, [my compromise] amendment 2623 is a combination of the best of the three other bills [H.R. 85, H.R.
7020, and S. 1480], and an elimination of the worst, or at least the most controversial [provisions] . . . .”).
61. The Stafford-Randolph compromise bill kept the strict liability standard by specifying that liability under CERCLA should be construed to be the
same as Section 311 of the Clean Water Act. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (2012). That
section of the Clean Water Act provides that when an “owner or operator of [a]
vessel from which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged in violation of
[§ 1321(b)(3)] . . . [he shall] be liable to . . . [the government] for the actual
[cleanup costs].” 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f ) (1) (2012). Early courts relied on this reference to the Clean Water Act to determine that liability under CERCLA Section
107 was strict. See, e.g., United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp.
823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1114
(D.N.J. 1983); City of Philadelphia v. Stephen Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135,
1140 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
62. Maloney, supra note 26, at 532 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. S30,932 (daily
ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph (D-W. Va.))).
63. Id. at 532–33 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. S30,932 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)
(statement of Sen. Randolph (D-W. Va.))).
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amended S. 1480 “as gutting a progressive environmental bill,”64
the Senate passed the Stafford-Randolph compromise in the
waning days of the outgoing 96th Congress.65 However, because
Superfund “was in part a revenue measure . . . it was necessary
to treat it as if it had formally been initiated in the House.”66
Thus, in considering H.R. 7020, the Senate “substituted and incorporated” the Stafford-Randolph compromise, passed it by a
voice vote, and sent it to the House for final consideration.67
The House considered the amended H.R. 7020 on December
3, 1980.68 While some members of Congress were reluctant to
pass the Senate version of the bill,69 others were in favor of passing a flawed bill because “they felt that . . . legislative action was
necessary,”70 and that any delay in passing the Stafford-Randolph compromise bill would only “prolong the overall danger
that the public ha[d] been exposed to already.”71 Thus, motivated
in part by the strongly held belief that something had to be done
to hold polluters financially responsible for cleaning up hazardous contamination, the House approved the bill by a relatively
wide margin.72 President Carter then signed the Superfund bill,
putting it into effect on December 11, 1980.73 CERCLA’s liability
provisions are facially ambiguous and only provide that covered
persons “shall be liable,” without specifying a standard of liability.74 However, the legislative history indicates that the scope of
64. Id. at 533.
65. Id. at 533–34.
66. Id. at 536.
67. Id. (citing 126 CONG. REC. S30,987 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)).
68. Id.
69. Congressman James Broyhill, for example, was concerned that there
were “dozens of defects” and that the liability provisions of the bill were uncertain. Id. at 539 (citing 126 CONG. REC. H31,969 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Broyhill (D-N.C.))).
70. Congressman Mario Biaggi, for example, argued that any further backand-forth between the Senate and the House of Representatives concerning additional changes to the bill would likely result in no legislation being enacted
until the following session. Id. at 540 (citing 126 CONG. REC. H31,974 (daily ed.
Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Biaggi (D-N.Y.))).
71. Id. (quoting 126 CONG. REC. H31,973 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement
of Rep. Vento (D-Minn.))).
72. The final vote was “274 in favor, 94 against and 64 not voting.” Id. at
541 (citing 126 CONG. REC. H31,981–82 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980)).
73. Id.
74. CERCLA’s main liability provision, Section 107, provides that any covered persons or entities (see infra Part I.B for a discussion on the scope of covered persons) “shall be liable for,” inter alia, all cleanup costs incurred by the
government not inconsistent with the National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012). The NCP is
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liability under the Superfund statute was meant to be “determined under common law principles,”75 including giving defendants the burden of proving divisibility as a defense to joint and
several liability.
B. CERCLA’S LIABILITY SCHEME AND THE DOCTRINE OF
DIVISIBILITY
Despite the Congressional debate surrounding the liability
provisions of CERCLA, it is clear from the legislative history and
subsequent case law that Superfund liability under Section 107
was intended to be joint and several through the application of
“traditional and evolving principles of common law.”76 Indeed,
“most courts recognize that CERCLA does not mandate the imposition of joint and several liability,” but will apply such a
standard “when a person or entity causes a single and indivisible
harm.”77
CERCLA Section 107 provides insight into when exactly a
person can be held liable for such a harm. There are four general
classes of parties, referred to in CERCLA as Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs), who are subject to potential joint and several liability under Section 107: (1) current owners and operators
of a facility; (2) past owners and operators of a facility; (3) entities that generated or arranged for hazardous substance
transport and/or disposal; and (4) entities that transported the
hazardous material.78 If an entity fits into one of the four PRP
categories, strict liability is triggered if: (1) there are hazardous
wastes present at the facility; (2) there is a release (or a threatened release) of the hazardous substances; and (3) response costs
have been or will be incurred.79
the federal government’s blueprint for implementing CERCLA and “outlines a
step-by-step process for conducting both removal and remedial actions.” See SUPERFUND ORIENTATION MANUAL, supra note 8, at II-6.
75. Maloney, supra note 26, at 546 (internal citation omitted).
76. Id. at 541 (citing 126 CONG. REC. H31,965 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Florio (D-N.J.)) (emphasis added)).
77. Lawrence S. Coven, Liability Under CERCLA: After a Decade of Delegation, the Time Is Ripe for Legislative Reform, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 165, 192
(1990) (citing United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 1988)
(applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (AM. LAW INST. 1976)), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989)).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4); see also Enforcement: Superfund Liability,
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/superfund-liability (last visited Oct. 31,
2018).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4); see also Enforcement: Superfund Liability,
supra note 78.
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The text of statute states that following the releaseor
threatened releaseof a hazardous substance, PRPs may only
escape liability by proving that the release was caused by an act
of God, war, or a third party.80 However, through the application
of common law tort liability principles, courts have determined
that PRPs may also escape joint and several liability by proving
that the harm is divisible—a rare showing that usually has a
high evidentiary bar.81 To determine whether harm is divisible,
or capable of being apportioned among multiple causes, courts in
CERCLA cases turn to Section 433A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, and ask whether “there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.”82 The
doctrine of divisibility is an important piece of the Superfund
puzzle because it gives PRPs the opportunity to escape the powerful jaws of joint and several liability, and to only be held liable
for a portion of the total cleanup cost proportional to that party’s
culpability.83
80. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). CERCLA has three narrowly defined affirmative
defenses, and in lieu of proving one of them, PRPs may only escape joint and
several liability under Section 107 by showing that the harm in question is divisible. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 14, at 308. Currently, the third party defense
excludes innocent landowners, bona fide prospective purchasers and contiguous
property owners from Superfund liability if the party in question can meet a
number of statutory requirements. See, e.g., Sudhir Lay Burgaard, Landowner
Defenses to CERCLA Liability, A.B.A. YOUNG LAW. DIVISION: 101 PRAC. SERIES
PUBLICATIONS, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/
publications/the_101_201_practice_series/landowner_defenses_to_cercla_
liability.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2018). CERCLA’s statutory defenses are narrowly construed by the courts and “PRPs have had difficulty meeting their burden.” Frank Leone & Mark A. Miller, Acts of God, War, and Third Parties: The
Previously Overlooked CERCLA Defenses, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,129, 10,135
(2015).
81. See, e.g., Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 827 n.3 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The only exception to joint liability is when the harm is divisible, but this is a rare scenario.”); United States v. NCR Corp., No. 10–C–910, 2017 WL 3668771, at *5
(E.D. Wis. Aug. 23, 2017) (appeal filed) (“Prior to Burlington Northern, exceptions to joint and several CERCLA liability were considered rare and the EPA
could usually recover its costs in full from any responsible party, regardless of
that party’s relative fault.”).
82. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 614
(2009) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST.
1965)). Courts use the Restatement (Second)’s approach in analyzing divisibility
of harm because it reflects tort common law at the time that the Restatement
was written. See infra notes 88–99 and accompanying text.
83. Parties found liable under Section 107 may also sue other liable parties
or PRPs for contribution pursuant to CERCLA Section 113(f ) . This process allows courts to “allocate response costs among liable parties using . . . equitable
factors . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f ) . However, where there are no viable PRPs to
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The first seminal case that analyzed the liability standard
under Section 107 of CERCLA was United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp.84 In Chem-Dyne, the United States sued twenty-four alleged generators and transporters of the hazardous substances
discovered at the Chem-Dyne Superfund Site under Section 107
of CERCLA for recovery of costs expended in carrying out remedial activities.85 The defendants moved for partial summary
judgment, asking the court to determine that they were not
jointly and severally liable for remediation costs at the ChemDyne facility in an effort to mitigate their financial exposure.86
In denying the defendants’ motion, the court turned to Superfund’s legislative history to glean the Congressional intent behind the statute.87 Importantly, the court noted that the deletion
of the term “joint and several liability” from Superfund was to
avoid a blanket rule applicable in all cases that might lead to
inequitable results, rather than an outright rejection of joint and
several liability in all cases.88 The court went on to explain that
liability under the statute was to be determined under “common
law principles” and that the application of joint and several liability would be determined on a case-by-case basis evaluating
the complicated scenarios at multiple-generator Superfund
sites.89
Because CERCLA’s subject matter was “easily distinguish[able] from areas of primarily state concern,” the statute
was passed “in the exercise of a constitutional function or
power,” and federal programs “must be uniform in character,”
the court determined that the standard of liability should be determined under a uniform federal common law rule.90 Relying on
legislative history, the court refused to apply a generally applicable rule of joint and several liability similar to the standard
sue in contribution, a liable party’s only option to blunt the harshness of joint
and several liability is to prove divisibility of harm (absent an applicable statutory affirmative defense). See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
84. See Gold, supra note 14, at 311–12, 312 n.25 (referring to United States
v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) as the seminal CERCLA
opinion dealing with the issue of liability and apportionment of harm under
CERCLA Section 107).
85. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 804.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 805–08 (analyzing the impetus of Superfund’s enactment and the
lengthy floor debates that occurred in both the House and Senate in considering
the amended version of S. 1480 for passage).
88. Id. at 808 (internal citations to legislative history omitted).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 808–09.

2018]

SUPERFUND & TORT COMMON LAW

1013

under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,91 more commonly known as the Clean Water Act.92 Instead, the court applied the common law approach of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts: “when two or more persons acting independently cause[]
a distinct or single harm for which there is a reasonable basis for
division according to the contribution of each, each is subject to
liability only for the portion of the total harm that he has himself
caused.”93 However, where a single and indivisible harm is
caused by two or more persons, each person is potentially liable
for the entire harm.94 The court also determined that where two
or more persons’ actions combine to violate CERCLA, and a defendant seeks to limit their liability on the basis that the harm
is divisible, that defendant bears the burden of proving that the
harm is capable of apportionment.95 Construing the facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court then found that
the defendants had not met their burden in showing a reasonable basis for apportionment of harm, and accordingly denied the
motion for partial summary judgment.96
All CERCLA cases post-Chem-Dyne have affirmed the
court’s analytical framework and courts continue to apply the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in determining whether harm is
divisible, or whether joint and several liability is appropriate for
cost recovery actions under Superfund Section 107.97 Congress
eventually affirmed the Chem-Dyne court’s approach in its consideration of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization

91. Id. at 808 (“[T]he term [joint and several liability] was omitted in order
to have the scope of liability determined under common law principles, where a
court performing a case by case evaluation of the complex factual scenarios associated with multiple-generator waste sites will assess the propriety of applying joint and several liability on an individual basis.”).
92. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012).
93. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 433A, 881 (AM. LAW INST. 1976)).
94. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (AM. LAW INST.
1976)).
95. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (AM. LAW INST.
1976)).
96. Id. at 811.
97. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S.
599, 614 (2009) (“Following Chem-Dyne, the Courts of Appeals have acknowledged that ‘the universal starting point for divisibility of harm analyses in CERCLA cases’ is § 433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.” (citing Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc. v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2002)); United States v.
Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. R.W. Meyer,
Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989)).
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Act’s (SARA’s)98 contribution provision.99 This presumptive joint
and several liability that can only be tempered by proving divisibility may seem like a harsh practice because it is; Congress did
not design CERCLA to be fair. Rather, Congress designed CERCLA with two overarching goals—promoting timely cleanup of
sites contaminated with hazardous waste, and ensuring that
those responsible for the contamination pay for the cleanup
(“polluter pays”).100
Successful divisibility defenses were rare in the years after
Chem-Dyne.101 After Burlington Northern, described in the next
Section, many practitioners and commentators thought that the
Railroads’ success in proving divisibility of harm would ease the
burden of proof for future CERCLA defendants and make it easier for PRPs to successfully assert divisibility arguments.102

98. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) was
passed in 1986 and “codified judicial interpretation of CERCLA since 1980.”
Maloney, supra note 26, at 546 n.167 (citing SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.)).
99. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 n.23 (4th Cir. 1988)
(observing that the Chem-Dyne court’s approach towards analyzing joint and
several liability under CERCLA “was subsequently confirmed as correct by Congress in its consideration of SARA’s contribution provisions”).
100. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 602 (“[CERCLA] was designed to promote
the ‘timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites’ and to ensure that the costs of such
cleanup efforts were borne by those responsible for the contamination.”) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Util., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2005)).
101. See, e.g., Martha L. Judy, Coming Full CERCLA: Why Burlington
Northern Is Not the Sword of Damocles for Joint and Several Liability, 44 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 249, 283, 283 n.17 (2010) (stating that prior to 2009, of the 160
federal cases citing to Chem-Dyne, defendants met their burden of proving divisibility only four times).
102. See Cost Recovery: Burlington Northern Decision Called New Path to
Fairness Under CERCLA, TOXICS L. REP. (BNA) (May 21, 2009) (discussing
comments made by Burlington Northern’s counsel that the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the district court’s finding of divisibility on a “highly limited factual
record” in Burlington Northern “reverse[d] a long-standing presumption by
[EPA] in favor of joint and several liability in multiple-party cases”); see also
Gold, supra note 14, at 311 n.22 (referring to an article that argued “apportionment will be more available, more defendants will argue for apportionment, and
defendants will have increased leverage in settlement negotiations with government” as a result of Burlington Northern). But see Gold, supra note 14, at 311
(“[T]he Burlington Northern decision should have relatively limited impact on
CERCLA litigation, if federal courts understand and apply the Supreme Court’s
opinion properly.”); Cruden ELI Speech, supra note 1, at 1 (arguing that because
Burlington Northern “arose from an unusual fact pattern,” it is not “the death
knell of Superfund enforcement” and actually “reaffirms the law of joint and
several liability”).
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C. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF BURLINGTON NORTHERN103 AND
THE DIVISIBILITY FRAMEWORK
Pre-Burlington Northern, courts tended to allow apportionment only in relatively simple CERCLA cases, where divisibility
hinged on a single factor, such as at a site with geographically
separated pollutants or multiple PRPs operating a facility for
mutually exclusive periods of time.104 However, in affirming the
district court’s finding that the contamination at the Arvin Superfund Site was theoretically divisible and capable of apportionment, the Supreme Court relied on a combination of geographic,
temporal, and volumetric/toxicity factors.105
As discussed in the Introduction, B & B, the owner and operator of the Arvin facility and the party responsible for the contamination at the site, became insolvent in 1989 and was unable
to continue cleanup activities.106 That same year, EPA added the
Arvin Site to the National Priorities List (NPL)107 and, in cooperation with the California Department of Toxic Substances
Control (CDTSC), exercised its authority pursuant to CERCLA
Section 104 to begin cleanup activities at the site108 using monies
from the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund (Superfund
103. For simplicity’s sake, this Note does not address the Supreme Court’s
analysis of Shell Oil Co.’s liability as an “arranger.” For a detailed discussion of
the Burlington Northern “arranger” issue, see, for example, Steven Ferrey, Reconfiguration of Superfund Liability: The Disconnection Between Supreme
Court Decisions and the Lower Federal Courts, 41 SW. L. REV. 598, 608–10, 612
(2012) and Judy, supra note 101, at 253.
104. See Bina Joshi, Apportionment of CERCLA Liability Post-Burlington
Northern, 25 ENVTL. LITIG. 2, 2 (2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
litigation/committees/environmental-energy/articles/2014/spring2014
-apportionment-of-cercla-liability-post-burlington.html.
105. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 606, 615–17; see also Joshi, supra note 104,
at 3. Some scholars argue that the district court’s reliance on multiple factors
in determining apportionment was flawed. See, e.g., William C. Tucker, All Is
Number: Mathematics, Divisibility and Apportionment Under Burlington
Northern, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 312–13 (2011) (arguing that apportionment of a single harm has only been appropriate in simple cases, “when one
theory of divisibility was alleged,” and that the Supreme Court in Burlington
Northern affirmed a “flawed method of calculating the Railroads’ apportioned
share of liability,” resulting in an “artificially-created unapportioned share”).
106. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 605.
107. The National Priorities List, or NPL, “is the list of sites of national priority among the known releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances . . . throughout the United States,” and guides EPA in determining
which sites warrant further investigation. Superfund: National Priorities List
(NPL), EPA, https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-national-priorities-list
-npl (last visited Oct. 31, 2018).
108. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 605.
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Trust Fund).109 To recoup their expended cleanup costs, EPA and
CDTSC brought a cost recovery action110 against the Railroads
as joint owners of the leased nine-acre portion of the Arvin facility.111 Four years after a six-week bench trial,112 the district
court ruled in favor of the Government, holding that the Railroads were PRPs under CERCLA Section 107 as “owners of a
portion of the facility.”113
Although the Railroads did not explicitly raise the issue of
divisibility at trial, the district court sua sponte searched the evidentiary record to answer the question of divisibility.114 The district court first determined that the harm at the Arvin Superfund Site was a “single harm” consisting of “contaminated soil at
various locations and depths around the Site and one . . . plume
of contaminated groundwater.”115 Then, the district court found
that the length of time that B & B leased the parcel from the
Railroads was thirteen years, or 45% of the total amount of time
B & B was the sloppy operator116 of the facility,117 and that the
109. In addition to outlining the liability framework for PRPs, CERCLA authorized the creation of the Superfund Trust Fund, a fund financed by a tax on
the petroleum and chemical industries, general revenues, earned interest and
cost recoveries from PRPs. 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(11) (2012);
SUPERFUND ORIENTATION MANUAL, supra note 8, at II-1 to II-2. EPA uses monies from the Superfund Trust Fund to pay for site cleanup when PRPs cannot
be identified or if PRPs are unsuccessful at their own remediation and/or removal efforts. SUPERFUND ORIENTATION MANUAL, supra note 8, at II-2.
110. EPA has the authority, pursuant to CERCLA Section 107, to recover all
response action costs and damages to natural resources. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(A)–(D); SUPERFUND ORIENTATION MANUAL, supra note 8, at IV-3.
Typically, EPA will pursue cost recovery actions if negotiation and settlement
with PRPs is unsuccessful and the government chooses to perform the cleanup
work itself, or when PRPs are identified after the government has incurred response costs and seeks to recoup them. SUPERFUND ORIENTATION MANUAL, supra note 8, at IV-11.
111. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 605.
112. Id. (“The District Court conducted a 6-week bench trial in 1999 and four
years later entered a judgment in favor of the Governments.”).
113. Id.; see also United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., Nos.
CV-F-92-5068 OWW, CV-F-96-6226 OWW, CV-F-96-6228 OWW, 2003 WL
25518047, at *52 (E.D. Cal. July 15, 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 520 F.3d
918 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 556 U.S. 599 (2009).
114. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 622–23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing
the district court’s “heroic labor” in apportioning costs, despite the fact that the
Railroads did not make any arguments regarding apportionment of liability);
see also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2003 WL 25518047, at *87–91.
115. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2003 WL 25518047, at *87.
116. Id. at *95 (“By everyone’s account, B & B was a sloppy operator.”).
117. Id. at *88 (“The total length of the B & B-Railroad lease, 13 years, is
45% of the B & B total of 29 years of operations at the Site from 1960 to 1989.”).
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Railroads’ parcel constituted 19.1% of the surface area of the entire Arvin site.118 The district court also noted that the “overwhelming majority of hazardous substances were released from
the B & B parcel,” and not from the parcel leased by the Railroads.119 Taking the geographic and temporal factors into account, assuming that two-thirds of the site contamination resulted from chemical spills on the Railroads’ leased parcel, and
using a 50% “fudge factor,”120 the district court held that the
Railroads’ contribution to the harm at the Arvin Superfund Site
could be no more than 9%, and therefore, that they were responsible for only 9% of EPA’s total response costs at the facility.121
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed
that the harm caused by the Railroads was theoretically capable
of apportionment but reversed the district court and held that
the defendants had not met their burden in showing a reasonable basis for apportionment.122 Because the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Railroads had not met their burden in proving
divisibility, the ruling held the Railroads jointly and severally
liable for cleanup costs at the Arvin Superfund Site.123
The Supreme Court then reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the “District Court reasonably apportioned the Railroads’ share of the site remediation costs at 9%.”124 Specifically,

118. Id. (“The evidence shows that the Railroad parcel is approximately
19.1% of the surface area of the total site.”).
119. Id.
120. The Supreme Court held that “any miscalculation . . . [was] harmless
in light of the District Court’s ultimate allocation of liability, which included a
50% margin of error.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556
U.S. 599, 618 (2009).
121. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2003 WL 25518047, at *90–91
(multiplying together 19%, the proportion of the Arvin site’s surface area occupied by the Railroads’ leased parcel; 45%, the proportion B & B’s time spent as
the owner/operator of the facility during which it leased the Railroads’ parcel;
and 66%, the proportion of the site contamination attributable to spills on the
leased parcel, and allowing for calculation errors of up to 50%, the district court
arrived at an apportioned liability share of 9% for the Railroads).
122. The Ninth Circuit found that the record lacked sufficient data to determine the “precise proportion of contamination that occurred on the relative portions of the Arvin facility and the rate of contamination in the years prior to
B & B’s addition of the Railroad parcel.” Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 617. Further, the Ninth Circuit held that the lease duration and size of the leased area
were not reliable measures of the contamination on the portion of the site owned
by the Railroads. Id.
123. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 952
(9th Cir. 2008).
124. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 619.
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the Supreme Court concluded that the facts in the record “reasonably supported the apportionment of liability,” according to
the principles outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.125
The Court held that the district court’s use of the leased parcel’s
size and the lease’s duration as a starting point for its divisibility
analysis was reasonable, and that any miscalculations resulting
from the assumption that two-thirds of the contamination
stemmed from the leased parcel were rendered harmless by the
inclusion of a 50% margin of error.126 By limiting the Railroads’
share of the cleanup costs to 9% and not including the portion of
the harm attributed to the then-insolvent B & B, the Court required the government, and by extension the taxpayers, to pay
for an “orphan share”127 of approximately 91% of the total site
remediation costs.128
In the aftermath of Burlington Northern, many practitioners and commentators thought that the Supreme Court’s significant deference to the district court’s finding of divisibility using
multiple theories of apportionment on a highly complicated factual record would result in a lower burden of proof for PRPs arguing for an apportionment of liability.129 However, as the next
Part shows, that has not been the case. Subsequent decisions
125. See Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 617–19. Even though the burden of proving divisibility normally falls to the party raising the defense, the district court
took it upon itself to perform the apportionment analysis because the railroads
and the government both “effectively abdicated providing any helpful arguments to the court” by taking an all-or-nothing approach to liability and advocating for 0% and 100% liability, respectively. United States v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry., No. CV-F-92-5068 OWW, No. CV-F-96-6226 OWW, No. CV-F96-6228 OWW, 2003 WL 25518047, at *82 (E.D. Cal. July 15, 2003). The Supreme Court did not address the burden of proof issue, instead framing the
question as “whether the record provided a reasonable basis for the District
Court’s conclusion that the Railroads were liable for only 9% of the harm caused
by contamination at the Arvin facility.” Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 615.
126. Id. at 617–19.
127. An orphan share is the share of liability at a given Superfund site that
can be attributed to an insolvent or defunct party or nonparty. See Kenneth K.
Kilbert, Neither Joint nor Several: Orphan Shares and Private CERCLA Actions, 41 ENVTL. L. 1045, 1067 (2011).
128. See Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 618–19; see also Bradley Marten, U.S.
Supreme Court Holds that Superfund Liability Is Not Joint and Several Where
a Reasonable Basis for Apportionment Exists; Court also Narrows Arranger Liability, MARTEN L. (May 4, 2009), https://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/
20090504-superfund-liability.
129. See supra note 102 and accompanying text; see also Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 2d 431, 483 (D.S.C. 2011) (“Some
legal commentary and case law have interpreted Burlington Northern to lessen
the burden on defendants seeking to avoid joint and several liability by demonstrating a reasonable basis for apportionment.”).

2018]

SUPERFUND & TORT COMMON LAW

1019

have determined that Burlington Northern simply reiterated the
Chem-Dyne approach to apportionment and did not endorse a
shift in the divisibility analytical framework.130
II. SITE COMPLEXITY AND AN OUTDATED ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK CONTRIBUTE TO CERCLA DEFENDANTS’
LACK OF SUCCESS IN ASSERTING DIVISIBILITY
DEFENSES
In the thirty-three post-Burlington Northern apportionment
cases,131 courts continue to limit divisibility in all but the simplest circumstances. Section A delves into a representative selection of post-Burlington Northern apportionment cases and argues that PRPs’ lack of success in proving divisibility defenses is
due in part to the reliance on the Restatement (Second) of Torts
as the analytical framework. Section B discusses the trends in
United States tort law and argues that the judiciary’s current
approach to analyzing apportionment of harm in CERCLA cases
is outdated. Section C discusses the major differences between
the Restatement (Second) and the Restatement (Third), and contends that the latter better reflects the current state of tort common law.
A. POST-BURLINGTON NORTHERN, APPORTIONMENT OF HARM
CONTINUES TO BE A HIGH BAR FOR CERCLA DEFENDANTS TO
REACH
Superfund jurisprudence after Burlington Northern has
continued the trend of widespread joint and several liability for
PRPs sued for cost recovery under CERCLA Section 107,132 and
courts continue to exclusively use the Restatement (Second) of
Torts in analyzing apportionment of harm.133 Since Burlington
Northern, there have been thirty-three CERCLA cases analyzing
the issue of apportionment; only two concluded that the harm in
130. See, e.g., United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., No. 91–0768–
JAM–JFM, 2010 WL 1854118, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2010); Joshi, supra note
104. See also infra Part II.A, for a discussion of post-Burlington Northern cases
dealing with divisibility defenses.
131. See infra Appendix, for a table of CERCLA cases that analyze the issue
of divisibility of harm.
132. See Derek Wetmore, Joint and Several Liability After Burlington
Northern: Alive and Well, 32 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 27, 40–44, 59 (2014).
133. See, e.g., United States v. NCR Corp., 688 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“The ‘universal starting point for divisibility of harm analysis in CERCLA
cases’ is § 433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.” (quoting Burlington N.,
556 U.S. at 614)).
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question was divisible.134 The PRPs’ success in asserting a divisibility defense in both cases was likely due, at least in part, to
the simple factual circumstances surrounding the contamination, compared to that at a typical Superfund site, allowing the
courts to find a reasonable basis for apportionment of harm.
1. Successful Divisibility Defenses: Reichhold and City of Gary
The first post-Burlington Northern case resulting in a successful divisibility defense is Reichhold, Inc. v. U.S. Metals Refining Co.,135 a 2009 case issued shortly after Burlington Northern. Despite the Reichhold trial taking place before Burlington
Northern was decided, the Supreme Court’s decision apparently
influenced the New Jersey federal court’s divisibility analysis.136
Reichhold, Inc. conducted a series of real estate transactions,
triggering an affirmative duty under a state environmental statute for the company “to investigate possible environmental contamination at the Site and to remediate such contamination.”137
After expending cleanup costs, Reichhold sued United States
Metals Refining Company (USMRC) for cost recovery under
CERCLA Section 107 as the past owner of the contaminated
site.138 Reichhold sought to be reimbursed for, inter alia, the cost
of capping139 a particular parcel of soil at the site as required by
the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
(NJDEP).140
The Reichhold court found that the contamination that necessitated the cap had two separate causes—USMRC’s historic
smelting operations and extensive use of large amounts of metallic slag as fill material throughout the parcel, and a third
party’s depositing of an additional two to three feet of fill material containing hazardous metals—and that either cause alone
would have spurred NJDEP to require installation of the cap.141
134. City of Gary v. Shafer, No. 2:07–CV–56–PRC, 2011 WL 3439239, at *3
(N.D. Ind. Aug. 5, 2011); Reichhold, Inc. v. U.S. Metals Ref. Co., 655 F. Supp. 2d
400, 448–49 (D.N.J. 2009).
135. Reichhold, 655 F. Supp. 2d 400.
136. See id. at 448 (“The recent Supreme Court decision in [Burlington
Northern] suggests that this situation might be addressed by apportionment
rather than equitable principles.”); Wetmore, supra note 132, at 41.
137. Reichhold, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 406.
138. Id. at 404.
139. See supra note 17 for more information on capping as a remedy for soil
contamination.
140. Reichhold, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 448.
141. Id.
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Looking to the then-recent Burlington Northern opinion for guidance, the Reichhold court determined that the hazardous metals
contamination that was remedied by the cap was a “distinct or
single harm that USMRC and a third party caused,” and that
the reasonable basis for apportionment was the fact that “each
[party] was responsible for a sufficient amount of metals contamination that required the cap.”142 Thus, rather than apportioning
the harm according to the amount of hazardous metal contamination that each party was directly responsible for, the Reichhold court split the difference and held USMRC liable for fifty
percent of the costs associated with the cap.143
The second post-Burlington Northern case where a PRP successfully asserted a divisibility defense is City of Gary v.
Shafer.144 Despite the court’s citing of Burlington Northern, City
of Gary is not an example of an easing of the divisibility standard,145 partly because the court’s order seems to conflate Section
107 apportionment with Section 113 allocation through its reliance on equitable factors in “apportioning” the harm.146 Despite
the case being a CERCLA Section 107 cost recovery claim,147 the
court cited both CERCLA Section 107, which allows for apportionment of liability when there is a reasonable basis for dividing
causation, and CERCLA Section 113, which allows for allocation
of liability considering causation and equitable factors.148 Nevertheless, because of the small number of cases involving successful divisibility defenses, it is illuminating to discuss the facts
and analysis underlying the apportionment issue in City of Gary.
The defendant in City of Gary, Paul’s Auto Yard, Inc., was
the operator of the site in question for approximately two years
142. Id. at 448–49 (adopting the Burlington Northern court’s use of the Restatement (Second) in analyzing divisibility of harm at the site).
143. Id. at 449. Both parties in Reichold were financially solvent and able to
pay their half of the bill. See id.
144. City of Gary v. Shafer, No. 2:07–CV–56–PRC, 2011 WL 3439239, at *3
(N.D. Ind. Aug. 5, 2011).
145. Wetmore, supra note 132, at 42.
146. City of Gary, 2011 WL 3439239, at *1–3. “While section 107 determines
the amount of contribution based solely on actual contamination caused by
PRPs, section 113 allows courts to examine equitable concerns when allocating
liability.” Foy, supra note 24, at 640 n.113. Further, while any party that has
incurred cleanup costs (PRP or otherwise) may bring a Section 107 cost recovery
action, a contribution suit under Section 113 is only available to “PRPs already
subjected to an EPA-initiated cost recovery action or cleanup order.” Id. (citing
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004)).
147. See City of Gary v. Shafer, 683 F. Supp. 2d 836, 840 (N.D. Ind. 2010).
148. City of Gary, 2011 WL 3439239, at *2–3 (emphasis added).
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and moved a small amount of previously contaminated soil, resulting in a release of hazardous substances and liability under
CERCLA.149 At the damages phase of the trial, the court considered “the allocation of . . . [the defendant’s] proportionate share
of the total liability.”150 Relying on expert testimony, the court
determined that the defendant contributed to the lead contamination at the site through moving already-contaminated soil, but
that any contribution was de minimus.151 The court considered
temporal and volumetric factors, and held that “[the defendant’s]
proportionate share in the lead contamination of the soil . . . constituted no more than 0.24% of the whole of the contamination.”152 The court concluded that Paul’s Auto Yard, Inc.’s slight
moving of “no more than 0.24% of the total volume of lead-contaminated soil” within “a relatively short period of time” was “a
reasonable, objective, measurable, concrete, [and] specific basis
for allocation of liability” and ordered that Paul’s Auto Yard,
Inc.’s financial contribution be “0.24% of the total costs.”153
These two successful instances of a divisibility defense are
likely due, at least in part, to the simple factual circumstances
of each case. Despite the inclusion of equitable factors in City of
Gary, the court considered temporal and volumetric variables in
allocating liability154 and the Reichhold court apportioned liability of the single harm according to two distinct yet sufficient
causes.155
2. A More Typical Example: NCR Corpation’s Failed
Divisibility Defense in the Fox River Superfund Litigation
The methodologies used in these two cases might not be feasible in a situation with a more complex history of hazardous
waste contamination. For example, take United States v. NCR
Corp.,156 a more typical post-Burlington Northern Superfund
149. See id. at *2–4.
150. Id. at *1.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *2. Active soil contamination occurred for a period of approximately thirty-eight years and the defendant’s de minimus moving of contaminated soil occurred during a window of approximately 1.5 years, or about 3.95%
of the time period of interest. Id. The volume of lead-contaminated soil disturbed
by the defendant “was no more than 0.1% to 0.24% of the total volume of contamination.” Id.
153. Id. at *3.
154. See id. at *1–2.
155. Reichhold, Inc. v. U.S. Metals Ref. Co., 655 F. Supp. 2d 400, 448–49
(D.N.J. 2009).
156. United States v. NCR Corp., No. 10–C–910, 2017 WL 3668771 (E.D.
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case involving apportionment of harm at the Fox River Superfund site in Wisconsin, “one of the last and largest uncontrolled
sources of [toxic polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)] into Lake
Michigan.”157 The PCB contamination at the Fox River Superfund Site resulted primarily from the use of a PCB-containing
solvent in the production of carbonless copy paper from 1954 to
1971.158 Contamination at the site was pervasive, with several
paper mills discharging approximately 700,000 pounds of toxic
PCBs into the Fox River via “numerous wastewater discharge
points” over a period of seventeen years.159 Before cleanup at the
site began, there were approximately fourteen million yards of
contaminated sediments containing 65,000 pounds of PCBs, and
every year, an estimated 620 pounds of PCBs were flushed from
the river into Green Bay.160
Initially, a variety of paper mills, municipalities, and other
entities undertook voluntary and involuntary remedial actions
to clean up the PCB-laden sediments.161 However, NCR Corp.
(NCR), the sole manufacturer of the toxic coating on every sheet
of carbonless copy paper, eventually ceased its voluntary cleanup
activities after an unfavorable ruling against it left it without
the option to sue other PRPs in a Section 113 contribution action.162 EPA then filed a CERCLA action against NCR and
eleven other PRPs to compel cleanup activities.163 Because CERCLA’s statutory defenses were not available to NCR,164 its sole
defense to resisting EPA’s enforcement action was to show that
the “harm was divisible and thus capable of apportionment.”165

Wis. Aug. 23, 2017) (appeal filed).
157. Case Summary: NCR Corporation Agrees to End Litigation and Complete PCBs Cleanup at Fox River Superfund Site, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
enforcement/case-summary-ncr-corporation-agrees-end-litigation-and
-complete-pcbs-cleanup-fox-river (last visited Oct. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Case
Summary: NCR Corp.].
158. NCR Corp., 2017 WL 3668771, at *1.
159. Case Summary: NCR Corp., supra note 157.
160. Id.
161. NCR Corp., 2017 WL 3668771, at *2–3.
162. Id.
163. Id. at *4.
164. CERCLA’s three statutorily-defined defenses are the act of God, war,
and third-party defenses; these defenses have been narrowly construed by the
courts and are often difficult for PRPs to prove. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
165. NCR Corp., 2017 WL 3668771, at *4.
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Inspired by the Railroads’ success in asserting a successful
divisibility defense in Burlington Northern, NCR “focused its efforts in the enforcement action” on establishing a similar defense
“in an effort to substantially limit its ultimate liability.”166 Specifically, NCR undertook a very detailed and expensive study to
carefully map portions of the Fox River.167 Through sediment
analysis and historical document review, “one expert arrived at
an estimate of the percentage of the total PCBs each PRP discharged into [the Fox River] over . . . fifty-five years.”168 Another
expert entered that data into a computer model designed to
mimic the “movements of sediment and PCB transport in the
river.”169 A third expert then correlated the conclusions of the
first two experts with the actual remediation costs, dividing the
river into “73 apportionment polygons, and arrived at a calculation of each party’s share of the remediation cost in each polygon.”170
NCR and Glatfelter, another paper manufacturer PRP, presented the expert divisibility evidence over the course of a twoweek trial.171 Following full briefing on the apportionment issue,
the district court concluded that “NCR and Glatfelter had failed
to prove that the harm caused by the discharge of PCBs into the
river was divisible,” and held both parties jointly and severally
liable.172 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s holding that the harm was not divisible
and remanded the case, concluding that the district court had
failed to explain why the mass-percentage estimates of one of
NCR’s experts were unreliable.173
After remand and acting on multiple motions for reconsideration, the district court concluded that NCR failed to meet its
burden in demonstrating “both that the harm [was] theoretically
capable of divisibility and that there [was] a reasonable basis for
apportionment.”174 Specifically, the court noted that the exten-

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
2013)).
173.
2014)).
174.

Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. NCR Corp., 960 F. Supp. 2d 793 (E.D. Wis.
Id. (citing United States v. P.H. Glatfelter, 768 F.3d 662 (7th Cir.
United States v. NCR Corp., No. 10-C-910, 2015 WL 6142993, at *5
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sive briefing accompanying the motions for reconsideration illuminated the problem that the data relied upon by one of NCR’s
experts was inconsistent with “facts already found by the
court.”175 The court also pointed out that because EPA’s selected
remedy required dredging of all soils with a PCB concentration
greater than one part-per-million (ppm) and the cost of soil remediation was linearly proportional to the concentration of hazardous PCBs, any apportionment framework using a uniform remediation cost for any contamination greater than one ppm
could not serve as a reasonable basis for apportioning costs.176 In
other words, an acceptable apportionment framework should
have accounted for the higher costs associated with remediating
soil with higher levels of contamination. After the district court
concluded that NCR had not met its burden in proving divisibility, NCR filed what amounted to a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied,177 and requested certification for an interlocutory appeal on the divisibility issue.178 The district court denied
the certification request because any appellate review would involve a mixed question of law and fact, rather than a “pure question of law.”179 NCR did not pursue its divisibility defense any
further and eventually entered into a settlement agreement with
the government.180
The Fox River litigation is an excellent example of how most
Superfund divisibility cases have turned out post-Burlington
Northern. Despite undertaking an expensive study of the contamination at the Fox River Superfund site, NCR was unable to
establish a reasonable basis for apportioning the harm at the
site, due in part to the historical complexities of how the PCB
contamination occurred. In the aftermath of Burlington Northern, some courts “have rejected apportionment theories that do
not address the entirety of the harm or the entirety of factors
contributing to the harm at a site.”181 This makes sense because
(E.D. Wis. Oct. 19, 2015).
175. Id. at *1 (stating, inter alia, that NCR’s expert attributed over 9000 kg
of discharged PCBs to one PRP, despite a more credible expert finding that no
more than 1166 kg of PCBs could be attributed to that PRP).
176. Id. at *4–5.
177. United States v. NCR Corp., No. 10-C-910, 2015 WL 6912545, at *1
(E.D. Wis. Nov. 9, 2015).
178. Id.
179. United States v. NCR Corp., No. 10-C-910, 2016 WL 304805, at *2 (E.D.
Wis. Jan. 25, 2016).
180. United States v. NCR Corp., No. 10-C-910, 2017 WL 3668771, at *15
(E.D. Wis. Aug. 23, 2017).
181. Joshi, supra note 104, at 5 (citing, for example, Pakootas v. Teck
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the more complicated the history of contamination at a site is,
the more difficult it is to establish a reasonable basis for apportioning the entirety of the harm.
In arguing for divisibility, many PRPs point to factors such
as “the length of time a party is involved with the site, [the] area
of operation, or [the] geographic extent of chemical storage.”182
However, proving divisibility using only temporal and geographic factors is difficult at all but the simplest sites. These factors can only provide a reasonable basis for apportionment when
other variables, such as toxicity and synergistic effects, are relatively consistent.183 The complex contamination pathways found
at most Superfund sites and the related high burden of proof for
a successful showing of apportionment continue to be significant
hurdles for PRPs asserting divisibility defenses in the vast majority of CERCLA actions.184 In addition to the factual complexity of most Superfund sites, the judiciary’s reliance on the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the divisibility framework also
contributes to the high burden of proof for a successful divisibility showing because the framework is closer to the classic rule of
presumptive joint and several liability.185

Cominco Metals, Ltd., 868 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1117 (E.D. Wash. 2012)).
182. Wetmore, supra note 132, at 52. In fact, these factors provided the Railroads in Burlington Northern a reasonable basis for apportioning harm. Id.
183. Id.
184. Including the Fox River litigation, thirty-three courts have considered
divisibility defenses post-Burlington Northern, but for one reason or another,
PRPs have generally been unsuccessful in demonstrating a reasonable basis for
apportioning harm. See, e.g., United States v. Fed. Res. Corp., 691 F. App’x 441,
443 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that the PRP “did not provide the court with a reasonable basis for apportioning the harm at the . . . [s]ite” because it did not establish that there was a relationship between the volume of waste, the release
of hazardous substances, and the harm at the site); PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v. Ashley
II of Charleston LLC, 714 F.3d 161, 182–85 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding that the
harm at the site was not divisible because the PRP’s proposed basis for apportionment did not, inter alia, “provide for a reasonable estimate of the volume of
soil contaminated by secondary disposals” or appropriately compensate for
“changes in the type and intensity of uses and construction on the site over
time”); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 1092,
1117–18 (D. Colo. 2011) (finding that the PRP’s proposed basis for apportionment, relying on geographic and temporal factors, did not adequately address
the “complex assessment of the relative toxicity, migratory potential, and synergistic capacity of the hazardous waste”—a showing which is often required
when the harm to be apportioned consists of commingled wastes).
185. Cf. Wetmore, supra note 132, at 43 (describing the divisibility framework presented in the Restatement (Third) of Torts as a “more liberal apportionment analysis” compared to the analytical framework of the Restatement
(Second)).
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B. CERCLA’S CURRENT ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
DIVISIBILITY LAGS BEHIND THE REST OF TORT LAW
As discussed above, Burlington Northern endorsed the
Chem-Dyne court’s approach to divisibility analyses. While the
Court in Burlington Northern analyzed divisibility under the Restatement (Second), Chem-Dyne itself looked to the then-current
state of tort common law to determine the applicable liability
standard.186 The Chem-Dyne court concluded that in 1983, the
Restatement (Second)—adopted in 1976—best reflected the
state of federal common law regarding the proper analytical
framework for divisibility defenses to joint and several liability.187 Yet, despite CERCLA courts’ historical reliance on the Restatement (Second), “[t]he clear trend [in tort law] over the past
several decades has been a move away from pure joint and several liability.”188 Whereas the Restatement (Second) certainly
does not mandate joint and several liability and allows for apportionment of harm,189 in practice, joint and several liability is
widespread throughout Superfund litigation in part because of
the judiciary’s application of a test that is difficult for PRPs to
meet at all but the simplest sites.190 When the Restatement
(Third) was published in 2000, fifteen states still employed pure
joint and several liability schemes, with the remainder having
“adopted some hybrid form of joint and several and several liability.”191
Today, the trend in tort law has shifted even further away
from joint and several liability in favor of some form of comparative responsibility.192 Indeed, as of 2017, “forty states have modified the rule of joint and several liability,”193 twenty-eight of
186. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio
1983).
187. See id.
188. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Am. Tort Reform Ass’n in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 4, United States v. NCR Corp., 688 F.3d 833 (7th Cir.
2012) (No. 12–2069) [hereinafter ATRA Amicus Brief ] (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 17 cmt. a, reporter’s note (AM.
LAW INST. 2000)).
189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A, 881 (AM. LAW INST.
1976).
190. See supra Parts II.A.1–II.A.2, for a discussion of how divisibility defenses tend to only be successful at Superfund Sites with simple factual scenarios.
191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 17 cmt. a, reporter’s note.
192. See AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N., TORT REFORM RECORD 4–12 (2017),
http://www.atra.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Record-07-06-17.pdf.
193. Id. at 4.
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which have eliminated joint and several liability to some extent
for environmental harms.194 The majority of modifications to
state joint and several liability schemes have come about by legislation, as opposed to court decisions.195 Some scholars have argued that legislative efforts to blunt the harshness of joint and
several liability schemes should not be viewed as changing the
common law rule of liability.196 However, a state’s common law
is necessarily informed by that state’s legislation in the sense
that courts interpret statutes and are constrained by the legislature’s efforts.197 Thus, legislative changes to states’ joint and several liability schemes should still be considered when analyzing
the general shift among the states towards comparative responsibility schemes.
Just as the Restatement (Second) articulated the rules surrounding the applicable liability scheme in CERCLA actions
(drawing from both the common law and statutes that existed at
that time), the Restatement (Third) should also be viewed as an
accurate reflection of the common law that existed at the time of
its publication. While no courts have explicitly endorsed the Restatement (Third), at least one court has interpreted Burlington
Northern as “disallowing consideration of the Restatement
194. See id. at 4–12. The following states have shifted away from joint and
several liability schemes to some degree, including where there is some sort of
environmental harm at issue: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See id. The following states have also
shifted away from joint and several liability schemes to some degree, but retain
the potential for joint and several liability where there is some sort of environmental harm: Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. See id.
195. See id. In contrast to the pure legislative efforts of other states, Kentucky’s 1988 statute, HB 551, “codified the common law rule that when a jury
apportions fault, a defendant is only liable for that share of the fault.” Id. at 6.
196. Justin R. Pidot & Dale Ratliff, The Common Law of Liable Party CERCLA Claims, 70 STAN. L. REV. 191, 238, 238 n.256 (2018).
197. See also Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age
of the Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 549 (2007); Alexandra B. Klass,
From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact of CERCLA on Common Law
Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 903, 905
(2004); cf. Richard L. Revesz, Restatements and Federal Statutes, AM. L. INST.
(Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.ali.org/news/articles/restatements-and-federal
-statutes (“Traditionally, our Restatements dealt with areas of state common
law. Of course, they recognized the existence of state statutes but those statutes
were generally treated as constraints that displaced discrete common law rules
in particular jurisdictions.”).
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(Third) . . . approach to apportionment.”198 However, it is clear
that the Burlington Northern court’s reliance on the Chem-Dyne
approach to apportionment, that is, an inquiry into the divisibility of a single harm based on “evolving notions of common law,”
rather than the Restatement (Second) explicitly, indicates that
there should be some future role for the Restatement (Third) of
Torts in Superfund apportionment analyses.199
C. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS DIFFERS FROM THE
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) IN THAT IT REFLECTS THE STATES’
GENERAL SHIFT AWAY FROM JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
SCHEMES
The Restatement (Third) of Torts elaborates on the Restatement (Second)’s apportionment framework by “explaining that
apportionment is proper where [the] ‘legally culpable conduct of
a party . . . was a legal cause of less than the entire damages for
which the plaintiff seeks recovery’ and those less-than-entire
damages are calculable.”200 This broader interpretation for what
constitutes a reasonable basis for apportionment is “significantly
friendlier to PRPs” seeking to limit joint and several liability
through a showing of divisibility.201 Specifically, the Restatement (Third)’s apportionment provisions are friendlier to PRPs
asserting divisibility defenses because it employs a two-step process that first divides damages by causation into indivisible component parts, and second, apportions liability for each component according to principles of comparative responsibility.202 In
contrast, the Restatement (Second)’s apportionment provisions
simply divide damages by causation principles because those
rules were developed before states started to adopt comparative
responsibility schemes.203
Since most Superfund sites involve a relatively complex
harm stemming from the activities of multiple tortfeasors, it
198. See Foy, supra note 24, at 648–49 (citing Loving v. Sec’y of Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., No. 02–469V, 2009 WL 3094883, at *26 n.26 (Fed. Cl.
July 30, 2009)).
199. See id. at 669.
200. Id. at 645 n.148 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2000)).
201. Id.
202. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 26(a). Comparative responsibility refers to
apportionment that includes the fault or legal responsibility of the party as at
least one factor in the apportionment. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 487 n.1 (2d. ed., 2017) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1).
203. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 26 cmt. a.
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makes sense that bringing elements of comparative responsibility into the fold, rather than simply relying on principles of causation, will ease the burden on PRPs arguing for divisibility. Traditionally, CERCLA courts have only considered causation in
analyzing whether harm at a given site is divisible,204 but some
scholars have argued that courts should consider noncausation
principles, such as common law contribution, in assessing liability for cost recovery claims under Section 107.205 Considering
that the Restatement (Third) reflects the vast majority of states’
shift away from joint and several liability in favor of some form
of comparative responsibility,206 it would be permissible for
courts to consider non causation principles in apportioning harm
under CERCLA Section 107 because the Restatement (Third)’s
apportionment framework reflects the current state of tort common law.
In an amicus brief filed in the Fox River litigation, the American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) argued that the Seventh
Circuit should have adopted the Restatement (Third) in analyzing whether the harm at the site was divisible.207 The court declined to do so, stating that Burlington Northern required the
Restatement (Second) to be used in analyzing divisibility, and
that such a departure from precedent based on a “policy argument” would be “best directed to Congress.”208 However, because
Congress intended for liability under CERCLA Section 107 to be
governed by evolving principles of common law, the courts have
a permissible route to apply a contemporary analytical framework that furthers the policy that “no party should be liable for
harm it did not cause, and an injury caused by two or more persons should be apportioned” according to their causal shares.209
204. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S.
599, 614 (2009).
205. See Pidot & Ratliff, supra note 196, at 260–61 (arguing that PRP cost
recovery claims, contrasted with government-initiated cost recovery claims,
“should be governed by common law contribution principles”); see also Kilbert,
supra note 127, at 1071–77 (arguing for an analysis of equitable factors in determining liability in PRP cost recovery claims).
206. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), intro. (“[A]ll but four states and the District of
Columbia have adopted comparative responsibility. That change raised a host
of new issues, which are the subject of this Restatement.”).
207. See ATRA Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at *3–11.
208. United States v. NCR Corp., 688 F.3d 833, 838 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012).
209. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 26 cmt. a; 7th Circuit Declines to Apply
Third Restatement of Torts in Apportionment Case, SCHNAPF LLC (Aug. 19,
2012), http://www.environmental-law.net/2012/08/7th-circuit-declines-to-apply
-third-restatement-of-torts-in-apportionment-case.
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III. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT THE RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS IN ANALYZING DIVISIBILITY TO
EFFECTUATE LEGISLATIVE INTENT
By analyzing the apportionment issue under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Burlington Northern court “reiterated the status quo,”210 while recognizing “that ‘traditional and
evolving principles of common law’ control the scope of liability
under CERCLA.”211 Thus, rather than automatically applying
the analytical framework outlined in the Restatement (Second),
courts should look to the current state of tort common law in
choosing an analytical framework for divisibility.212 As discussed
above, the vast majority of states have moved away from joint
and several liability in favor of comparative responsibility
schemes that allow for a more equitable apportionment of liability tied to the party’s culpability, and this shift is reflected in the
Restatement (Third).213 In analyzing divisibility defenses under
CERCLA, courts should apply the Restatement (Third) because
of the widespread trend of states moving away from the rule of
joint and several liability and because applying the Restatement
(Third) is supported by several policy arguments.
The Chem-Dyne court was the first to consider the appropriate standard for liability under CERCLA cost recovery claims.214
In making that inquiry, the court turned to the legislative history of CERCLA and observed from both the House and Senate
proceedings that liability under Section 107 was meant to be governed by “evolving principles of common law,” rather than applying a joint and several liability standard across the board.215
All post-Chem-Dyne decisions have applied the Restatement
(Second) in analyzing divisibility of harm216 but that is because
210. Wetmore, supra note 132, at 43.
211. Foy, supra note 24, at 651 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 613 (2009)).
212. Id. at 668 (“[C]ourts should not read [Burlington Northern] to require
blind adherence to the apportionment principles of the Restatement (Second).
Instead, courts presented with CERCLA-related divisibility questions must vigilantly track developments in liability-apportionment jurisprudence, and update their standards to reflect these developments.”).
213. See supra Parts II.B and II.C; see also Kilbert, supra note 127, at 1073.
214. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
215. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 807–08 (S.D. Ohio
1983).
216. E.g., Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 614 (“Following Chem-Dyne, the Courts
of Appeals have acknowledged that ‘the universal starting point for divisibility
of harm analyses in CERCLA cases’ is § 433A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.”).
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the Restatement (Second) had, for the most part, best-reflected
the state of tort common law. In 1983, at the time of the ChemDyne decision, most states followed a rule of contributory negligence, whereby a plaintiff’s own negligence would bar any recovery.217 This rule is reflected in the Restatement (Second)’s apportionment provisions and as applied to divisibility of harm, makes
it extremely difficult for PRPs to limit their liability on the basis
of divisibility, even where those PRPs don’t contribute to a substantial portion of the contamination.218
However, beginning in the late 1980s, many states moved to
comparative responsibility schemes that are reflected in the Restatement (Third)’s provisions regarding apportionment of liability.219 In contrast to contributory negligence schemes, comparative responsibility schemes dictate that a plaintiff’s negligence
is simply a factor that can reduce that plaintiff’s recovery, rather
than serving as a complete bar.220 Applied to divisibility of harm,
the Restatement (Third)’s apportionment provisions give defendants a more flexible framework within which they can argue that
the harm at a given Superfund site is divisible. This is achieved
by considering noncausation factors, like fault or other equitable
principles, in addition to causation, in determining whether apportionment is appropriate for a particular defendant.221 Given
that Congress indicated that CERCLA liability was meant to be
determined under evolving principles of common law, it is permissible for courts to adopt the Restatement (Third) in analyzing
apportionment of harm because it reflects the current state of
tort common law more accurately than the Restatement (Second)
does.
The adoption of the Restatement (Third) is further supported by several policy arguments. First, because CERCLA
doesn’t influence current behavior,222 applying a more liberal apportionment framework would not necessarily incentivize PRPs
217. See Kilbert, supra note 127, at 1073.
218. See supra Part II.A, notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
219. See Kilbert, supra note 127, at 1073; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2000); AM. TORT REFORM
ASS’N supra note 192, at 4–12.
220. See Kilbert, supra note 127, at 1073.
221. See supra notes 200–03 and accompanying text.
222. CERCLA is focused on liability for contamination that has already occurred, whereas liability relating to current management practices involving
hazardous substances falls under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2012). See also Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) Laws and Regulations, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/rcra
(last visited Oct. 31, 2018).
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to behave badly.223 The Resource Conservation Recovery Act
(RCRA) has its own provisions for “corrective action” that mandate the cleanup procedures for mismanagement of hazardous
waste.224 Thus any deterrence factor for would-be-polluters
would be coming from RCRA, not CERCLA, and updating the
analytical standard for divisibility is not likely to result in more
pollution.
Second, “[b]y encouraging apportionment, the Restatement
(Third) mirrors the broader trend away from joint and several
liability,”225 which can be attributed in part “to the biased targeting of deep-pocketed defendants that tends to accompany
joint and several liability.”226 This biased targeting is analogous
to EPA’s cost-recovery practices whereby EPA focuses on a few
financially viable PRPs to bear the entire financial burden of the
government’s remediation and/or removal costs.227 EPA focuses
on financially viable PRPs to shoulder the cost of cleanup even
where those PRPs are not responsible for a substantial portion
of the contamination at issue, or are tangentially related to the
site in question.
In some cases it might be fair for a PRP to bear the entire
financial burden of remediating a Superfund site, for example,
when that PRP is directly responsible for a substantial portion
of the hazardous waste contamination. However, where PRPs
only cause discrete, calculable proportions of the contamination
or are being sued by EPA because of their status as a current site
owner, they should not be held financially responsible for more
than their fair share. A more liberal apportionment framework
gives such PRPs a better opportunity to prove that the harm is
divisible.

223. Jerry Taylor, Hazardous Waste Landfills and Superfund, CATO INST.
(June 22, 1995), https://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/
hazardous-waste-landfills-superfund.
224. See RCRA Corrective Action Cleanup Enforcement, EPA, https://www
.epa.gov/enforcement/rcra-corrective-action-cleanup-enforcement (last visited
Oct. 31, 2018).
225. Foy, supra note 24, at 648 n.172 (citing Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Asbestos
Litigation and Bankruptcy: A Case Study for Ad Hoc Public Policy Limitations
on Joint and Several Liability, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 203, 213–15 (2003)).
226. Id. (citing Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms’ Winners and Losers: The
Competing Effects of Care and Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 920 (2008)).
227. Id. (citing Jason E. Panzer, Apportioning CERCLA Liability: Cost Recovery or Contribution, Where Does a PRP Stand?, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 437,
451 (1996)).
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Burlington Northern is an excellent example of how EPA
sought to recover all of their cleanup costs from a financially viable PRP that was not responsible for a substantial portion of
the contamination. Despite the Railroads prevailing in their divisibility defense using the more stringent principles of the Restatement (Second), the district court found that there was a reasonable basis for apportionment of harm and calculated the
Railroads’ contribution to the contamination at the Arvin Superfund Site using geographic, temporal, and volumetric/toxicity
variables.228 In upholding the district court’s apportionment calculations, the Supreme Court let the government, and by extension, the taxpayers, shoulder the remaining ninety-one percent
orphan share that should have been paid by the actual polluter
at the site—B & B.229
Thus, where a defendant can prove divisibility of harm, it is
appropriate for the government to foot the bill for the remaining
costs that can be attributed to defunct parties, even where the
defendant asserting divisibility does have some connection to the
contamination in question.230 In adopting the Restatement
(Third) for analyzing divisibility defenses, courts would be giving
less-culpable PRPs a better chance at mitigating potential joint
and several liability because the Restatement (Third) is a more
defendant-friendly approach to analyzing apportionment of
harm. As discussed above, this analytical shift is overdue, given
the prevalence of state comparative negligence schemes that are
reflected in the more liberal apportionment framework of the Restatement (Third).
There is a legitimate counterargument that easing the burden on PRPs who assert divisibility defenses would result in the
government (and by extension, the taxpayers) picking up the remaining portion of the cleanup bill. This is exactly what happened in Burlington Northern, as the Court forced the government to absorb approximately ninety-one percent of the cleanup
costs at the Arvin Superfund Site. While the “polluter-pays”
principle makes sense when the PRP in question was the party
directly responsible for a substantial portion of the contamination, it is less fair when a company has complete turnover of its
228. See supra notes 105–28 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
230. See generally Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556
U.S. 599 (2009); Steven A. Kunzman, Supreme Court Rules Arranger Liability
and Apportionment Under CERCLA in Burlington Northern, DIFRANCESCO,
BATEMAN, KUNZMAN, DAVIS, LEHRER & FLAUM P.C. (Aug. 14, 2009), http://
newjerseylaw.net/arch/hello-world/.
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employees, shareholders, and customers, and those individuals
are footing the cleanup bill.231 To make “polluter-pays” true to
its name, the government would have to identify and invoice a
company’s employees, shareholders, and customers that existed
at the time when the pollution occurred.232 This endeavor would
be extremely difficult in practice, however, and opponents of this
Note’s solution may argue that a company in its current state,
even if it is less culpable than its corporate predecessor, is the
next best option.
However, where the government seeks joint and several liability against a PRP who is not directly responsible for a substantial portion of the contamination because there are no solvent PRPs who are more culpable, it is reasonable to allow that
PRP to limit their liability by proving divisibility.233 In the case
of a successful divisibility defense, it would be more equitable to
spread the cost of the remaining orphan shares among as many
people as possible (i.e., the taxpayers) rather than forcing a less
culpable PRP to foot the bill for contamination they did not
cause, simply because they are tangentially related to the site in
question. Further, just as Medicare, unemployment insurance,
Social Security, and other programs aimed at bettering the community at large are funded by American taxpayers, effective
cleanup of hazardous contamination is of paramount interest for
all individuals. Where less culpable PRPs are successful in limiting their liability through divisibility defenses and there are no
financially viable PRPs who are more culpable, it is fair to allow
the government to pay for the remaining orphan shares because
the community at large receives the benefit from remediated Superfund sites. In light of the shift towards liability schemes that
aim to limit a defendant’s liability according to her relative responsibility, it is less reasonable than ever before to hold PRPs
jointly and severally liable when they are not directly responsible for a substantial portion of the contamination at issue and
when they could potentially limit their liability by proving divisibility under the Restatement (Third).
CONCLUSION
Despite the fanfare in the aftermath of Burlington Northern,
Superfund divisibility jurisprudence since the seminal Supreme
231. Taylor, supra note 223.
232. Id.
233. Exactly as the Railroads were able to do in Burlington Northern, 556
U.S. 599.
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Court decision has confirmed that there was not a gigantic shift
in the law, and that apportionment of harm in CERCLA cases
should be governed by evolving principles of common law. The
lack of successful divisibility defenses by PRPs is likely due to a
variety of factors, including the complexity of the contamination
at most Superfund sites and the Restatement (Second)’s relatively high burden of proving a “reasonable basis for apportionment of harm.” States have also been steadily moving towards
adopting rules which apportion liability in line with a defendant’s culpability. Thus, to bring the analytical framework for
CERCLA divisibility into the twenty-first century, courts should
adopt the Restatement (Third)’s approach towards apportionment, which is broader and friendlier towards PRPs asserting
divisibility defenses. The adoption of a new framework is further
supported by the fact that it would give less culpable PRPs a
better opportunity to limit joint and several liability, a harsh
rule that is becoming rarer as states continue to move towards
comparative responsibility schemes.
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